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Abstract  
The aim of the present study is to explore the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
and CEO's overconfidence in earnings on restatement of financial statements of companies listed on 
Tehran Stock Exchange. Research population of this study includes all companies listed on Tehran 
Stock Exchange and sample size is obtained equal to 123 companies by using screening method. In 
this study, CEO's overconfidence in earnings, the number of board’s members, percentage of non-
bounded members of board and CEO duality are considered as independent variables in order to 
study their effect on restatement of financial statements. In this study, panel data with fixed effect is 
used and results obtained from analyzing 123 companies during the time period of 2008 - 2012 by 
using multiple variable regression test at 95% confidence level indicated that there is a direct 
relationship between CEO duality and CEO's overconfidence in earnings with restatement of 
financial statements. It was also indicated that there is a reverse relationship between percentages of 
non-bounded board members with the extent to which financial statements are restated. On the other 
hand, results indicated that there is no significant relationship between board size and restatement of 
financial statements.  
Keywords:  Restatement of financial statements, CEO's overconfidence in earnings, number 
of board members, CEO duality 
Introduction  
One of the most important qualitative characteristics of accounting information is its 
reliability. According to theoretical concepts of financial reporting, a reliable information refers to a 
piece of information which is free from mistake and biased tendencies. Studied conducted 
previously in Iran indicate that a high percentage of Iranian companies for correcting accounting 
mistakes, restate their financial statements and report a figure as year-end-adjustments (Sarvari 
Mehr, 2006; Kordestani et al., 2010). This indicates that it is doubted that accounting information of 
companies are free of mistake and error. Year-end-adjustments and restatement of financial 
statements of previous periods are accompanied by multiple negative outcomes. Net profit figure is 
used as a basis for calculating a number of items such as board bonus, tax and shareholders' 
dividends. In addition, earnings per share and the ratio of price to earnings per share are among 
indices which are used by analysts and investors. Therefore, incorrect statement of earnings and its 
restatement in subsequent periods, that is after making the relevant decisions, might have various 
economic and financial effects and outcomes for different individuals. Another negative outcome of 
year-end adjustments is its effect on auditor's reputation. The aim of auditors is to accreditation of 
financial statements and when audited financial statements of previous periods are restated 
repeatedly for significant accounting mistakes, society's trust in auditors' opinions is reduced 
(Nikbakht and Rafiee, 2012).  
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For understanding possible motivations of companies for incorrect statement of accounting 
figures and restating it in subsequent periods, we should look for factors which justify such a 
behavior and action. Conducted studies in the field of fraud reporting have mentioned various 
motivations for such actions. Some researchers with assuming that, restatement of financial 
statements are rooted in common motivations, reason that these motivations can manifest 
themselves in financial and economic information and characteristics of these companies. In this 
way, with paying attention to factors such as corporate governance structure, it might be possible to 
predict restatement of financial statements. In fact, the more efficient and effective the corporate 
governance mechanisms in a company are, lower levels of restatement of financial statements are 
expected in that company, which is due to reduced information asymmetry as well as reduced 
agency costs (Nikbakht and Rafiee, 2012).  
In recent years, the importance of corporate governance has been increasing. Application of 
corporate governance procedures and standards not only can cause improvement in companies' 
performance, but also can improve economic outcomes resulting from announcement of corporate 
governance standards. In other words, application of corporate governance has two main 
advantages:  1) the advance resulting from its application in organizations and improvement of 
organizational performance; and 2) economic outcomes resulting from it and it effect on share value 
of company (Ditmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). 
Corporate governance mechanisms are divided into two groups of internal and external 
organizational mechanisms. Internal mechanisms refer to board size, board composition ratio of 
bounded/ non-bounded members and so on. And external mechanism include all the rules, 
regulations and requirements that an organization should apply in its structure and operation, such as 
regulation related to financial structure and management's rewards and incentives of a company. In 
internal structure of corporate governance, board composition itself is affected by a number of 
factors: board size, CEO duality and bounded and non-bounded board members (Chi, 2005).  
Regarding the effect of board size on company value, studies so far haven't reached a 
conclusive outcome.  
Dalton et al., (1999, have concluded that larger boards improve management's decisions and 
recommendations. When, a person at the same time is a board member and CEO of a company, in 
this case, it is possible that the CEO moves toward self-interest and against the interests of the 
company, or, he might fail in evaluation and supervision of his own performance as CEO of the 
company which all of these reduces company value (Drobetz et al., 2004). Contrary to the above 
findings, Tan, Chang & Tan (2001) have found out that CEO duality in complex managerial 
environments create several advantages for a company. Therefore, CEO duality has both negative 
and positive effects on company value. Non-bounded board members have a supervisory role. Byrd 
& Hickman (1991)  and Bhagat et al. (1994) have concluded that a board with non-bounded 
members is more objective-oriented comparing to bounded members. For example,  in case of poor 
performance of the company, the board can quickly oust and replace the manger with low 
performance  (cited by Beik Beshroye et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, one of the tools for managers to interact with market, is to provide 
information about company's earnings prediction and hereby, companies can affect market behavior. 
Due to lack of certainty in operating environment, mangers' estimations are not complete from 
commercial perspective and although, incomplete estimations of mangers affect earnings forecast 
process, focus of analysts and users of financial information on earnings forecast, is larger than their 
focus on other forms of disclosed information outside financial statements and the reason for this is 
that forecasted earnings, in addition to reflecting management's forecast about future prospect, is 
quantitative and verifiable. Quality of the presented   forecasts by managers is much higher than the 
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quality of forecasts presented by individuals outside of an organization and the reason is that, 
management always have more information about the company status and are informed about 
current projects of the organization and have access to financial information details from previous 
accounting periods. In addition, often allocate considerable resources to financial forecasts 
(Asadollahi, 2010). The main issue is that whether these forecasts are efficiently reliable or no.  
Management's forecast in spite of having a number of advantages are as well accompanied 
with some problems. Among these problems, is that managers themselves have the highest level of 
interest from the profit of their company. High profit increases the value of a company and increases 
mangers' rewards as well. Therefore, it is possible for managers to forecast earnings with bias and to 
get engaged in earnings managing and to state earnings more than its actual level (Onama M., 2008). 
On the hand, mangers' forecasts are often affected by their beliefs. Managers can be divided into two 
groups of  "rational" and "overconfident" according to their beliefs (Bradbury et al., 2006). The 
main prediction of this model is that overconfident mangers comparing to rational mangers, 
overestimate earnings and this in turn leads to increased prediction error in mangers and inevitably 
to adjustment of earnings and financial statements figures in subsequent periods. Therefore, it is 
expected that higher CEO's overconfidence   in earnings would lead to higher level of restatement of 
financial statements (Persly and Abbot, 2013).  
Considering the above arguments, the main research problem in this study is as below:  
What is the effect of CEO's overconfidence in earnings and board composition on 
restatement of financial statements in companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange?  
For answering the above research question, research method, findings and conclusion are 
presented in following sections.  
Research methodology  
This study is a subcategory of positive studies, and considering the fact that for testing 
research hypothesis historical data was used, the present study is a semi-empirical study. The 
method of this study is inductive and Ex post facto (that is, by using past data and information) and 
the statistical method used in this study is a hybrid correlation (time series and cross-sectional data), 
that is, studying the existence of any relationship between research variables by using regression 
test.  
Research model, variables and their calculation  
Research hypothesis 1: CEO's overconfidence in earnings is effective on restatement of 
financial statements. 
In this study, for testing research hypothesis 1, the following regression model was used:  
RESTATE =β0+β1 COC +β2growth + β3 LEVERAGE + β4 ROA +ԑi, 
Research hypothesis 2: Board size is effective on restatement of financial statements.  In this 
study, for testing research hypothesis 2, the following regression model was used:  
RESTATE =β0+β1 BOARDSIZE +β2growth + β3leverage + β4 ROA +ԑi, 
Research hypothesis 3: Percentage of non-bounded board members is effective on 
restatement of financial statements of companies. In this study, for testing research hypothesis 3, the 
following regression model was used:  
RESTATE =β0+β1 OUTSIDER + β2growth + β3 LEVERAGE + β4 ROA +ԑi, 
Research hypothesis 4:  CEO duality is effective on restatement of financial statements in 
companies. In this study for testing research hypothesis 4, the following regression model was used:  
RESTATE =β0 +β1 CEOCHAIR +β2growth + β3 LEVERAGE + β4 ROA +ԑi, 
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Dependent variable 
RESTATE = Monetary value of the total restated items in financial statements of the 
company.  
Independent variables 
COC (CEO Overconfidence) = CEO's overconfidence in earnings. Various methods have 
been presented for evaluation of CEO's overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005; 2008), have 
used the decisions related to exerting authority in trading shares of a company as a criterion for 
evaluating clear convictions of CEOs. Since, CEOs are exposed to high levels of risk due to the 
characteristics of stock options, risk-averse CEOs are reluctant to hold stock options and are inclined 
to exert the stock options quickly. Therefore, those CEOs who hold stock options for a longer period 
of time, are more confident about their future performance. In Iran, stock options hasn't been created 
yet, and hence, the criterion of Lin et al. (2005)  is used as per the following:  
(Average price for six months ending to the end of financial year) / (Actual earnings - 
Forecasted earnings) 
If the value obtained from above is positive, it indicates CEO's overconfidence in earnings, 
otherwise, CEO is conservative or in other words, rational.  
BOARDSIZE = Board size which is the number of members of the board.  
OUTSIDER = Percentage of non-bounded members of the board which is the ratio of non-
bounded board members divided to total number of board members.  
CEOCHAIR= CEO duality which is a dummy variable. This variable takes a value of 1, if, 
CEO is a board member, otherwise it is equal to 0.  
Control variables 
GROWTH= Growth of total sum of company's assets to previous period.  
ROA = Return on assets which is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets.  
LEV = Financial leverage which is calculated as the ratio of Total debt to total assets.  
Research population and sample  
Since, the time domain of this study covers the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2012, hence, 
research population of this study is consisted of all the companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange. 
Systematic elimination sampling method with the following conditions for companies was applied:  
Necessary data for calculating research operating variables should be available.  
Should have been listed in Stock Exchange at least from 2008 and should have been active in 
Stock Exchange until the end of the timeframe of this study.  
The end of their financial year should be March 19th.  
They should not be among financial, investment institutions or banks.  
Industries studied in this research include: automotive and parts manufacturing, medicine, 
metal products manufacturing other non-metallic mineral products, cement - lime - plaster, 
petroleum coke and nuclear fuel, basic metals, sugar and sugar cube, tile and ceramic, rubber & 
plastics, machinery and equipments, chemical products, food and beverages except sugar and sugar 
cube, textile and other industries.  
Research findings  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of research variables during the timeframe of this 
study. Descriptive statistics of research variables, which were measured by using firms data during 
the timeframe of this study (2008 - 2012), include average, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of research variables 
Variables description  Average Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max. 
RESTATE Level of restatement of 
financial statements  
0.0615 0.0626 0.0292 0.0086 0.1090 
CEO's overconfidence 
in earnings  
CEO's overconfidence in 
earnings  
0.2103 0.2126 0.0908 0.0537 0.3651 
BOARDSIZE Board size  5.113 5.000 0.4628 5.000 7.000 
OUTSIDER Percentage of non-
bounded board members  
0.5650 0.6000 0.2684 0.2000 1.0000 
CEOCHAIR CEO duality  0.1533 .0000 0.3606 0.0000 1.0000 
GROWTH Assets' growth 0.0151 0.0080 0.0789 -0.1183 0.1630 
ROA Return on assets  0.2353 0.2357 0.0614 0.1322 0.3408 
LEV Financial leverage  0.662 0.6623 0.1046 0.4863 0.8411 
For example, as it is shown in table 1, average level of restatement of financial statements, 
CEO's overconfidence in earnings, board size and percentage of non-bounded board members are 
equal to 0.0615, 0.2103, 5.113 and 0.5649, respectively.  The mean of restatement of financial 
statements, CEO's overconfidence in earnings, board size and percentage of non-bounded board 
members is equal to 0.0626, 0.2126, 5.000 and 0.6000, respectively.  Standard deviation level of 
financial statements, CEO's overconfidence in earnings, board size and percentage of non-bounded 
board members is equal to 0.291, 0.09075, 0.462 and 0.268, respectively.  
In the following, for assuring the assumptions of classic regression test, classic regression 
test was used for testing research hypotheses and the results of this test are presented below: 
Testing research hypothesis 1  
"CEO's overconfidence in earnings is effective on restatement of financial statements."  
The value of f-test (11.276) indicates that the whole regression model is significant. 
Coefficient of determination and adjusted coefficient of determination of the above model are equal 
to 64.2% and 61.7%, respectively. Therefore, it is concluded that in this regression equation, about 
61.7% of the changes in the level of restatement of financial statements of companies is explained 
by independent and control variables.  
According to the results presented in table 2, significance level of the variable of CEO's 
overconfidence (COC) is equal to 0.000, which is smaller than the significance level of 5% 
considered in this study; also, absolute value of t-test related to this variable (5.073) is larger than 
the obtained value for t-test from table with the same freedom degree.  
Table 2. Results obtained from regression equation fit (by panel data method) 
Variable  Coefficient of variable Value of coefficient t-test Sig. level 
Constant  B0 1.522 2.873 0.004 
CEO's overconfidence in earnings  B1 1.234 5.073 .000 
GROWTH B2 2.467 3.838 .000 
LEVERAGE B3 0.461 0.588 0.561 
ROA B4 -1.21 -0.158 0.875 
Coefficient of determination  0.642 F-test 11.276 
Adjusted coefficient of 
determination  
0.617 Significance (P-Value) .000 
Durbin-Watson test 1.925 
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Therefore, at 95% confidence level, the obtained coefficient for the above variable in 
regression model is significant and hence, research hypothesis 1 is confirmed, indicating that there is 
a significant relationship between CEO's overconfidence in earnings and restatement of financial 
statements.  
Testing research hypothesis 2  
"Board size is effective on restatement of financial statements."  
The value of f-test (17.672) indicates that the whole regression model is significant. 
Coefficient of determination and adjusted coefficient of determination of the above model are equal 
to 52.6% and 49.8%, respectively. Therefore, it is concluded that in this regression equation, about 
49.8% of the changes in the level of restatement of financial statements of companies is explained 
by independent and control variables.  
Table 3. Results obtained from regression equation fit 
Variable name  Variable coefficient Coefficient value t-test Sig. level 
Constant  B0 6.961 3.091 0.006 
Board size  B1 1.091 0.879 0.321 
GROWTH B2 -0.818 -0.458 0.281 
LEVERAGE B3 1.501 2.987 0.0037 
ROA B4 -0.811 -2.847 0.014 
Coefficient of determination  0.526 F-test 17.672 
Adjusted coefficient of determination  0.498 Significance (P-Value) .000 
Durbin-Watson test  1.781 
Testing research hypothesis 3  
"Percentage of non-bounded board members is effective on restatement of financial 
statements of companies."  
The value of f-test (13.025) indicates that the whole regression model is significant. 
Coefficient of determination and adjusted coefficient of determination of the above model are equal 
to 691.2% and 66.5%, respectively. Therefore, it is concluded that in this regression equation, about 
66.5% of the changes in the level of restatement of financial statements of companies is explained 
by independent and control variables.  
Table 4. Results obtained from regression equation fit 
Variable name  Variable coefficient Coefficient value t-test Sig. level 
Constant  B0 3.641 2.873 0.004 
OUTSIDER B1 -0.913 -2.761 0.021 
GROWTH B2 2.719 2.037 0.049 
LEVERAGE B3 -0.741 -2.091 0.039 
ROA B4 4.981 2.873 0.004 
Coefficient of determination  0.691 F-test  13.025 
Adjusted coefficient of determination  0.665 Significance (P-Value) .000 
Durbin-Watson test  2.435 
Testing research hypothesis 4  
"CEO duality is effective on restatement of financial statements in companies."  
The value of f-test (9.162) indicates that the whole regression model is significant. 
Coefficient of determination and adjusted coefficient of determination of the above model are equal 
to 41.8% and 38.9%, respectively. Therefore, it is concluded that in this regression equation, about 
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61.7% of the changes in the level of restatement of financial statements of companies is explained 
by independent and control variables.  
Table 5. Results obtained from regression equation fit 
Variable name  Variable coefficient Coefficient value t-test Sig. level 
Constant  B0 0.811 7.832 0.000 
CEOCHAIR B1 1.923 4.534 0.000 
GROWTH B2 0.976 0.732 0.308 
LEVERAGE B3 1.712 2.871 0.004 
ROA B4 -0.268 -2.342 0.0075 
Coefficient of determination  0.418 F-test  9.162 
Adjusted coefficient of 
determination  
0.389 Significance (P-Value) .000 
Durbin-Watson test  2.021 
Conclusion  
In investors' view, restatement of financial statements, not only indicate to the existence of 
problems and issues in the performance of the previous period, but also is considered as a kind of 
prediction of problems for the future of a company and its management as well and strips away the 
confidence and trust of investors to credibility and competence management and quality of the 
reported earnings (Aghayi et al., 2013). Studying the financial statements of companies listed on 
Tehran Stock Exchange indicated that, the financial statements of most of the companies have some 
year-end adjustments. In Iran, almost all the year-end adjustments are related to errors' correction. 
Therefore, year-end adjustments in simple words, indicates that there were significant mistakes in 
previous years' financial statements and if shareholders look at these financial statements more 
carefully, these year-end adjustments bear a negative message about the credibility of financial 
statements (Bozorgasl, 2008). Considering the importance of this topic, the present study explored 
the effect of board composition and CEO's overconfidence in earnings on restatement of financial 
statements in companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange and results indicated that there is a direct 
relationship between CEO duality and CEO's overconfidence in earnings with restatement of 
financial statements. It was also indicated that there is a reverse relationship between percentage of 
non-bounded board members  with the level of restatement of financial statements. On the other 
hand, results indicated that there is no significant relationship between board size and restatement of 
financial statements. Considering the above stated results, the following practical recommendations 
are presented:  
Legislative bodies including Stock Exchange Organization of Tehran, audit organization, 
Iranian Society of Certified Public Accountants and ... should pay attention to the relationships 
between corporate governance mechanisms, CEO's overconfidence in earnings with restatement of 
financial statements in companies mentioned in the present study.  
Stock Exchange organization and Iranian Society of Certified Public Accountants are 
recommended to help users in making optimized decisions for optimized allocation of capital in the 
market by providing them with the indices related to corporate governance and ranking companies 
in this regard so that through this they can increase transparency in decision making environment.  
Considering the findings of this study, Capital market participants, decision makers, financial 
analysts and Actual and potential investors of Stock Exchange are recommended to pay special 
attention to the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms, CEO's overconfidence in 
earnings with restatement of financial statements of companies in their analysis of investment in 
financial assets and securities; because consideration of these important factors leads to optimized 
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selection of investment portfolios with minimum risk and maximum return and at the same time, 
increases transparency of decision making environment and the obtained results and outcomes.  
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